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H
urricane Katrina’s disastrous flooding of
the Gulf Coast confirmed three decades
of warnings by scientists. Most of New
Orleans is below sea level, and South Louisiana’s
coastal wetlands, which once helped buffer the city
from giant storms, have been disappearing at a
spectacularly swift pace. Now some researchers are
calling for restoration of wetlands and barrier
islands to help protect New Orleans the next time
a hurricane strikes. 
An average of 34 square miles of South Louisiana
land, mostly marsh, has disappeared each year for
the past five decades, according to the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS). As much as 80% of the
nation’s coastal wetland loss in this time occurred in
Louisiana. From 1932 to 2000, the state lost 1,900
square miles of land to the Gulf of Mexico. 
By 2050, if nothing is done to stop this process,
the state could lose another 700 square miles, and
one-third of 1930s coastal Louisiana will have van-
ished. Importantly, New Orleans and surrounding
areas will become ever more vulnerable to future
storms. “New Orleans can’t be restored unless we
also address coastal and wetland restoration too,”
says Craig E. Colten, a geographer at Louisiana
State University (LSU). 
A River and a City 
The vast watershed of the Mississippi River
ranges from Montana in the west to New York
H
urricane Katrina’s disastrous flooding of
the Gulf Coast confirmed three decades
of warnings by scientists. Most of New
Orleans is below sea level, and South Louisiana’s
coastal wetlands, which once helped buffer the city
from giant storms, have been disappearing at a
spectacularly swift pace. Now some researchers are
calling for restoration of wetlands and barrier
islands to help protect New Orleans the next time
a hurricane strikes. 
An average of 34 square miles of South Louisiana
land, mostly marsh, has disappeared each year for
the past five decades, according to the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS). As much as 80% of the
nation’s coastal wetland loss in this time occurred in
Louisiana. From 1932 to 2000, the state lost 1,900
square miles of land to the Gulf of Mexico. 
By 2050, if nothing is done to stop this process,
the state could lose another 700 square miles, and
one-third of 1930s coastal Louisiana will have van-
ished. Importantly, New Orleans and surrounding
areas will become ever more vulnerable to future
storms. “New Orleans can’t be restored unless we
also address coastal and wetland restoration too,”
says Craig E. Colten, a geographer at Louisiana
State University (LSU). 
A River and a City 
The vast watershed of the Mississippi River
ranges from Montana in the west to New YorkEnvironmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 114 | NUMBER 1 | January 2006  A 41
Spheres of Influence | Louisiana’s Wetlands
B
i
l
l
 
H
a
b
e
r
/
A
P
 
P
h
o
t
o
Wetlands
state in the east. Spring rains send sediment-rich
runoff into the river and its tributaries. For thou-
sands of years, the Big Muddy has flowed down
to the Gulf of Mexico, where great floods peri-
odically burst over the riverbanks, allowing huge
quantities of silt to settle and nourish wetlands.
The land naturally sinks, or subsides, as loose
sediments from the Mississippi River settle and
compact. 
The river slows as it reaches the gulf because of
the tides pushing upstream; as it slows down, it
spreads out and delivers much of its sediment load
into deltaic deposits. The Mississippi Delta was
fed by these influxes of mud, creating 5 million
acres of South Louisiana before the twentieth cen-
tury. Every millennium or so, the Mississippi
River would change direction at its gulf outlet,
meandering from east to west and back again. As a
result, the river created six different delta “lobes”
on which the entire coastline of South Louisiana
was formed. 
In 1718, French settlers founded New Orleans
on a natural ridge of high land on a bend of the
Mississippi River, with Lake Pontchartrain (which
is actually an inlet of the Gulf of Mexico) to the
north and coastal wetlands to the east, west, and
south. But flooding was a problem. By 1812, the
settlers had built levees on the east bank to Baton
Rouge, 130 miles upstream, and on the west bank
as far as Pointe Coupée, 165 miles upstream.  
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drained surrounding wetlands to prevent
disease and encourage development. The
city eliminated swamps following mosqui-
to-borne yellow fever epidemics that killed
40,000 residents between 1817 and 1905.
As the city grew, the only lands available for
development were low-lying areas north
toward Lake Pontchartrain. At the turn of
the twentieth century, the city created an
integrated public works department, which
was responsible for draining the wetlands.  
“It was the draining of the lower areas
that allowed suburbanization to occur,” says
Colten. But the lowlands, originally just
inches above sea level, steadily sank. “When
you drain these areas, you suck the water
out of the peaty soils, which begin to com-
press, or subside,” he says. “That’s why
these areas have continued to subside.” 
New Orleans also continually built
higher and stronger levees to contain river
flooding. In 1928, Congress authorized
major levee improvements, and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers began shoring up
the flood control system, including levees,
along the entire lower Mississippi and in
New Orleans. By the 1950s, LSU geology
professor James P. Morgan had begun to
document dramatic rates of land loss in
Louisiana’s coastal zone, which stretches
300 miles from the Texas border to the
Mississippi state line and 50 miles inland. 
The River Today
Today, South Louisiana is one of most
intensively engineered places in the nation.
Vast quantities of water are diverted or
rerouted through a lacework of navigation
corridors held in place by 2,000 miles of
earthen, rock, and concrete levees. Walled
off from the floodplains, the river can no
longer provide enough silt to the delta to
keep up with natural subsidence and sea
level rise. About two-dozen dams also hold
sediment back from the river and its tribu-
taries. “We have tamed the river for the
almost exclusive benefit of navigation,” says
David R. Conrad, a senior water resources
specialist with the National Wildlife
Federation.
The construction of high levees did end
the spring floods along the lower
Mississippi, but at an environmental cost,
eventually eliminating many of the wet-
lands, floodplains, and barrier islands of the
delta. “When you lose wetlands and flood-
plains, you lose their natural services includ-
ing storage capacity during floods, and when
you lose coastal wetlands, you lose wave and
storm protections,” says Sandra Postel,
director of the Global Water Policy Project,
a nonprofit organization based in Amherst,
Massachusetts. “Katrina in South Louisiana
was an example of what happens when you
disturb the natural infrastructure.”
In November 2005, the National
Academies released a report, Drawing
Louisiana’s New Map: Addressing Land Loss
in Coastal Louisiana. The report notes that
building and maintaining levees and dams
along the Mississippi River was a “more or
less ubiquitous” cause of wetland loss.
Another geographically widespread cause
was voracious grazing by nutria, a nonnative
species, which destroyed wetland vegetation. 
But the report also points out that there
were other causes “superimposed on these
broad influences,” particularly including
activities by the oil and gas industry.
Peaking during the 1960s through the
1980s, oil and gas companies dredged
canals for exploration. There are currently
10 major navigation canals and 9,300 miles
of pipelines in coastal Louisiana serving
about 50,000 oil and gas production facili-
ties. These canals, which are perpendicular
to the coast, have created new open water
areas, drowning wetlands and allowing salt-
water intrusion into freshwater ecosystems.
The result—land loss hot spots. “There is
also evidence,” the report says, “that extrac-
tion of large volumes of oil and gas has
exacerbated the problems of inundation and
saltwater intrusion”—that is, withdrawing
oil and gas along geologic faults seems to
exacerbate subsidence in coastal Louisiana.
The Mississippi Delta is also home to
South Louisiana’s port complex, which
lines both banks of the Mississippi River for
172 miles as well as points offshore, includ-
ing the Port of New Orleans, the Port of
South Louisiana, the Port of Baton Rouge,
and the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port in the
Gulf. Because of its size and location, adja-
cent to oil and gas refineries and drilling
platforms, this port complex is one the
most important in the United States.
Louisiana’s coastline produces one-fifth of
the country’s oil and one-quarter of its nat-
ural gas. Through South Louisiana’s ports
the bulk commodities of U.S. agriculture—
corn, wheat, and soybeans—are sent around
the world, and the bulk commodities need-
ed for American industry—steel and con-
crete, for instance—come into the country.
The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a lit-
tle-used 40-year-old shipping channel con-
necting the Gulf of Mexico to the
Mississippi River, is believed to have served
as a funnel for Katrina’s storm surge. The
navigation channel and the eastern levee of
the Mississippi River seem to have directed
high water into the Breton Sound estuary
southeast of New Orleans, according to
Greg Steyer, a USGS wetland scientist.
From there, the surge poured into Lake
Pontchartrain and an industrial canal,
where it overwhelmed levees, contributing
to flooding in St. Bernard Parish and the
Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans. Like
the oil and gas canals, the outlet also allows
saltwater intrusion and tidal action into
freshwater ecosystems, killing vegetation
and turning the marsh into a stretch of
open muddy water. 
The Gulf of Mexico is also subject to
the general sea level rise being observed
worldwide, with potential ramifications for
the Gulf Coast. Over the past century, the
warming climate has pushed up mean sea
level four to eight inches worldwide, and
computer models suggest that this rise will
probably accelerate, according to a 2001
report of the U.S. Global Change Research
Program, Climate Change Impacts on the
United States: The Potential Consequences
of Climate Variability and Change. By
2100, global sea level is projected to rise an
additional 19 inches along most of the U.S.
coastline. 
Death of the Wetlands
This combination of factors has killed wet-
lands in South Louisiana from the inside
out. “Some of the inner marshes have actu-
ally eroded faster than some of the extreme
coastal areas,” says Gary Fine, manager of
the Natural Resources Conservation
Service’s Golden Meadow Plant Materials
Center in Galliano, Louisiana. In the delta,
sediment deposits from tidal creeks and
rivers build up the banks, creating modest
natural ridges. Land elevations fall toward
the center of coastal marshes, freshwater
swamps, and bald cypress forests. Starved
of new sediments and flooded by tides, the
inner areas become constantly submerged.
“Especially in the salt marshes,” Fine
explains, “the plants start dying in the cen-
ter due to rising water and decreasing sedi-
ments, and then the loss expands outward
to the edges.” As a result, South Louisiana
has become a patchwork of open water and
remnant wetlands. 
“By 2050, the city will be closer to and
more exposed to the Gulf of Mexico,”
noted authors of a restoration proposal,
Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coastal
Louisiana. Hurricane Katrina itself pushed
the city closer to the coast. The hurricane,
making landfall in lower Plaquemines
Parish, had a storm surge of almost 30 feet,
which caused extensive erosion at the
coastal edge. For example, Katrina almost
wiped out the Chandeleur Islands, a 40-
mile-long series of uninhabited barrier
islands southeast of New Orleans. “The
sand and marsh are gone,” says Asbury
Sallenger, an oceanographer with the USGS
Center for Coastal and Watershed Studies
in St. Petersburg, Florida. “Before Katrina,
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there’s a less than half a meter left.” 
Gregory W. Stone, a coastal geologist
at LSU, says that if the current trend of
wetland loss and barrier island erosion con-
tinues, it will worsen the effects of future
hurricane surges in South Louisiana.
“Storm surge and storm waves will increase
if we lose more wetlands and our barrier
coast,” he says. “Wetlands and barrier
islands are the first line of defense. That
means areas such as New Orleans would
become more vulnerable to inundation.”
Further land loss would also endanger
oil and gas facilities, the huge port complex,
and the gulf’s valuable fishing industry.
South Louisiana’s wetlands are critical nurs-
ery areas for commercially important
marine species, including shrimp, blue
crabs, oysters, redfish, and menhaden. Land
loss in South Louisiana, says Stone, “is not
a local problem—it’s a national problem.” 
Restoration Plans
In an effort to rebuild the state’s natural
infrastructure, Congress passed the 1990
Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection,
and Restoration Act, sponsored by Senator
John Breaux (D–LA). The Breaux Act pro-
vides about $50 million each year for wet-
lands restoration projects in Louisiana.
The Breaux Act has provided funding for
118 restoration projects, and 75 projects
have already been built. But most of these
projects are relatively small in scale.
In 1996, the state of Louisiana and a
group of federal agencies joined with parish
officials and the public to create a consensus
document. The result, after 65 public meet-
ings over 18 months, was Coast 2050,
which outlined strategies and measures
needed to restore the state’s wetlands and
barrier islands. 
Coast 2050 proposed that the Missis-
sippi River be re-engineered to imitate nat-
ural processes. That is, some portion of the
river’s flow should be re-diverted via
pipelines or canals to flush into the delta so
that South Louisiana’s sinking ecosystems
could be built up. “Coast 2050 essentially
calls for putting holes in the straitjacketed
Mississippi River,” says Conrad. “This
process could be one of the most interesting
and expensive and important environmen-
tal engineering processes ever. It is a huge
opportunity to put things back together if
we have the will.”
These water diversions would feed
freshwater marshes and control saltwater
intrusion from being pushed upriver by
the rising sea level. The Caernarvon
Freshwater Diversion Project, funded in
the mid-1980s, could be one model for
this approach. The diversion consists of a
$26-million opening in the river levee built
by the Army Corps about 24 miles south of
New Orleans. A concrete culvert diverts
water into a canal that feeds marshes behind
Breton Sound, which had been losing land.
This diversion has been shown to increase
marsh and freshwater plant acreage. 
Coast 2050 also recommended that fed-
eral agencies dredge soils and ancient sand-
bars to create new marshlands; plug up the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet; and shore up
barrier islands that are the first line of
defense against approaching hurricanes.
However, the cost cited in the report for all
these projects seemed too huge to consider:
$14 billion (by comparison, estimates for
rebuilding after the 2005 hurricane season
have been placed as high as $200 billion). 
Kerry St. Pé, director of the Barataria-
Terrebonne National Estuary Program, says
there’s no time to waste. Freshwater diver-
sions alone are not enough to solve the land
loss problem, he adds. Dredge material
should be pumped immediately via pipes
from navigation channels in the delta,
including the Mississippi River, to shore up
hot spots of wetland loss. “We need the sedi-
ment now,” he says. The Corps of Engineers
already dredges 40–45 million cubic yards of
sediment from the delta’s numerous naviga-
tion channels each year, he says, and the
material is discharged off the end of the con-
tinental shelf because that’s the least expen-
sive method of disposal. “We could use that
sediment to build wetlands,” says St. Pé. 
From 2000 through 2003, the Corps
of Engineers and the state of Louisiana
collaborated on a feasibility study for a
$17-billion coastal restoration plan lasting
30 years. Yet this study, based on Coast
2050, also seemed far too expensive at the
time. “It never went up to Congress because
it exceeded what potentially could be fund-
ed,” says Steyer. “We were asked to focus it
on more of the near term, over ten years,
addressing what are the critical projects that
could be done.”
In November 2004, state and federal
agencies proposed a near-term effort, the
Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restor-
ation Study. The findings from this study
led to the 2005 Water Resources Develop-
ment Act, which calls for Congress to spend
$1.9 billion over 10 years on restoration
efforts in the delta; the bill is still being
worked out in Congress. The act—intend-
ed to be a first, smaller step toward a 30-
year $17-billion plan—follows the strategies
of Coast 2050, says Steyer. 
However, Oliver Houck, who directs
the environment program at Tulane
University Law School, says that nothing
less than letting the river go its own way will
solve the land loss problem. “Coast 2050 is
history,” he says. “Katrina upped the ante so
much. What has to be done now is to let the
Mississippi River take its natural course and
allow the full bed load of the river to rebuild
the marsh.” He adds, “The problem with
Coast 2050 and other restoration plans is
that they fail to halt wetland destruction in
the same areas they are trying to restore.
New canals, deeper canals, expanded ports
are all on the table. No way that works.”
Indeed, if water control projects were
destroyed and the Mississippi were allowed
to take its natural course, it would
inevitably become captured by the Atcha-
falaya River, which empties off the south-
central coast of Louisiana. The combined
flow and increased sediment load would
help build up the most land-starved region
of Louisiana’s coast. But if the Mississippi
River were set free, one of today’s most
important shipping channels would
become water-starved from Baton Rouge to
the gulf outlet. 
So how would giant oceangoing ships
reach the ports of South Louisiana? Houck
recommends cutting an entirely new ship-
ping channel from the gulf to the port com-
plex of South Louisiana. Where would this
channel be located? “That’s up to the engi-
neers,” Houck says.
A Muddy Future
No matter how it’s done, there is a new
urgency to address the land loss problem.
Senator Mary Landrieu (D–LA) has pro-
posed a Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief
and Economic Recovery Act, cosponsored
by Senator David Vitter (R–LA). This pro-
posal would provide $250 billion for hurri-
cane reconstruction, including $40 billion
in ecosystem restoration and levee improve-
ments. Some feel, though, that this propos-
al actually hurt Louisiana’s chances for
restoration monies by appearing to reach
for too much to fund a grab bag of pro-
jects. “Major restoration funding remains
in doubt,” says Houck, “as indeed does the
mega-question: how to restore.” At press
time the bill had not made any progress.
It has taken a major hurricane to show
the nation that it’s necessary to rebuild the
wetlands and barrier islands of Louisiana.
Although stakeholders have generally
agreed on a plan to rehabilitate these
resources, major funding has not been
available. To restore New Orleans to health
after Hurricane Katrina, though, it seems
clear that the nation must find a way to
fund the largest ecological rehabilitation
project in U.S. history, a comprehensive
effort to rebuild South Louisiana’s disap-
pearing landscape. 
John Tibbetts
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